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Abolishing Ius Sanguinis Citizenship:  
A Proposal Too Restrained and Too Radical
Kristin Collins
Costica Dumbrava maintains that ius sanguinis citizenship is a historically 
tainted, outmoded, and unnecessary means of designating political member-
ship. He argues that it is time to abandon it. His proposal is bold, and it has 
significant implications for an array of policies and practices. The parent- 
child relationship not only serves as a basis for citizenship transmission; it 
also entitles individuals to immigration preferences, and – in some coun-
tries – it facilitates automatic or ‘derivative’ naturalisation of the children of 
naturalised parents. In many countries that recognise ius soli citizenship, the 
parent-child relationship serves as an added requirement: one must be born 
in the sovereign territory and be the child of a citizen or a long-term legal 
resident. Dumbrava limits his challenge to ius sanguinis citizenship per se, 
and even suggests that family-based migration rights could be used to mini-
mise the disruptive effect of abolishing citizenship-by-descent. But his core 
complaints about ius sanguinis citizenship – the mismatch of biological par-
entage and political affinity, the difficulties of determining legal parentage – 
can be, and have been, levied against these various family-based preferences 
and statuses, which are likely found in every nation’s nationality laws. It is 
therefore important to consider his proposal in light of the role that the 
parent- child relationship plays in the regulation of migration, naturalisation, 
and citizenship more generally. With this broader context in mind, I concur 
with Rainer Bauböck and Jannis Panagiotidis that Dumbrava’s proposal 
rests on an under-informed assessment of the historical record. I also argue 
that that, as a remedy for the problems that he has identified, Dumbrava’s 
proposal is at once too restrained and too radical.
 The complex history of ius sanguinis citizenship
Dumbrava first argues that ius sanguinis citizenship should be abolished 
because, historically, it has been associated with ethno-nationalist concep-
tions of citizenship. I appreciate Panagiotidis’ insistence that ‘the problem is 
not with ius sanguinis itself, but with the respective contexts in which it is 
embedded’. Panagiotidis also reminds us that ius sanguinis citizenship has 
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sometimes functioned to create political communities that draw from differ-
ent ethnic and religious groups, as in the case of German Jews whose mem-
bership in the German polity was secured by the country’s ius sanguinis 
laws prior to the Nazi era. I want to elaborate and underscore the importance 
of this point with an additional example from United States history: During 
seventy years of Chinese exclusionary laws, ius sanguinis citizenship pro-
vided one of the very few routes to entry, and to American citizenship, for 
ethnic Chinese individuals born outside the U.S. For precisely that reason, 
exclusionists sought to limit or repeal the ius sanguinis statute, which recog-
nised the foreign-born children of American fathers as citizens.1 If one 
expands the historical frame to include parent-child immigration prefer-
ences and derivative naturalisation, the story becomes even more complex. 
By 1965, the race-based exclusions and national-origins quotas had been 
abolished, and previously excluded Asian families began immigrating to the 
U.S. in unprecedented numbers.2 They were able to do so by relying on the 
generous family-based preferences in American immigration and national-
ity laws, which facilitated entry, settlement, and – especially significant to 
this discussion – derivative naturalisation for children.3
Even a cursory review of the historical record thus counsels a cautionary 
assessment of the contention that ius sanguinis citizenship’s tainted past jus-
tifies its abolition. First, calls to end ius sanguinis citizenship have their own 
ugly history. Second, although one cannot gainsay that, in certain circum-
stances, ius sanguinis citizenship has been used to maintain ethnic homoge-
neity, the notion that parents and children do and should share the same 
political affiliation has also facilitated racial, ethnic, and religious diversifi-
cation of some political communities. Rather than abolish ius sanguinis citi-
zenship wholesale, we should be alert to the ways that it can operate as a tool 
1 For a discussion of these laws and efforts to restrict the recognition of ethnic 
Chinese individuals under the ius sanguinis citizenship statute, see Collins, 
K.A. (2014), ‘Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal 
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation’, Yale Law Journal 123 (7) 2134–
2235 (at 2170–2182). Starting in 1934, the ius sanguinis statute also allowed 
American mothers to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children. See id. 
at 2157.
2 See Reimers, D. (1983), ‘An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act 
and Third World Immigration to the United States’, Journal of American 
Ethnic History 9 (3): 23–24; Ong Hing, B. (1999), Making and Remaking 
Asian America Through Immigration Policy, 1850–1900. Stanford: SUP, 
81–120.
3 See, for example, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 245, 
§ 323.
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of ethnic exclusion and degradation in particular socio-legal contexts, and 
work to minimise those effects.4
 A proposal too restrained and too radical
To be fair, Dumbrava does not extend his proposal to migration and naturali-
sation policies that enlist the parent-child relationship; indeed, he would 
preserve such migration policies. He speaks only of traditional ius sanguinis 
citizenship, and argues that it often fails to map on to the reality of modern 
family formation, making it inadequate to ‘deal with contemporary issues 
such as advances in assisted reproduction technologies’ (ART), same-sex 
coupling and marriage, and the steady rise of nonmarital procreation. The 
problems Dumbrava identifies in this regard are important and difficult. But 
as a remedy for these problems, abolishing parent-child citizenship trans-
mission is simultaneously too restrained and too radical. It is too restrained 
because, after abandoning ius sanguinis citizenship we would still be con-
fronted with the difficulty of determining which parent-child relationships 
should count for purposes of regulating migration, derivative naturalisation, 
and (in many countries) ius soli birthright citizenship. Moreover, in all of 
these contexts, the ‘fundamental normative questions about who should be 
a citizen in a political community’ – and about the role that the parent-child 
relationship should play in that determination – would persist.
At the same time, Dumbrava’s proposal is too radical. He argues that ius 
sanguinis citizenship is not necessary to protect children from statelessness 
and ‘adds little to the legal and normative character of the parent-child rela-
tionship’. On this point I agree entirely with Bauböck and Scott Titshaw that 
Dumbrava underestimates the disruptive potential of his proposal. If all 
countries recognised unrestricted ius soli citizenship, Dumbrava’s assertion 
that ius sanguinis citizenship is unnecessary to prevent statelessness would 
be basically correct. But, in fact, very few ius soli countries go that far. 
Instead, as noted, they use ius sanguinis concepts to restrict the operation of 
ius soli birthright citizenship, thus leaving some children at a risk of state-
lessness if traditional ius sanguinis citizenship were abolished. And it is not 
just formal statelessness that would increase in a world without ius sangui-
nis citizenship. Children whose citizenship does not align with that of their 
4 A particularly notable example of how ius sanguinis principles can operate as 
tools of ethno-racial exclusion is the 2013 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal 
of the Dominican Republic, TC/0168/13, which effectively expatriated 
ethnic-Haitian individuals born and residing in the D.R., leaving hundreds of 
thousands of people stateless.
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parents can find themselves divided by nationality from the individuals who 
are charged, ethically and legally, with their care. As Bauböck and Titshaw 
observe, in an era of voluntary and compelled migration, ius sanguinis is the 
most effective method of protecting against such destabilising and precari-
ous circumstances.
 How to modernise?
I agree with Titshaw and Bauböck that the modernisation of ius sanguinis 
citizenship, rather than its complete repudiation, offers a better way to 
address the problems Dumbrava identifies. The difficult question is how? I 
am hesitant to embrace Titshaw’s proposed method of modernisation, and I 
offer a friendly but important amendment to Bauböck’s proposal.
Titshaw argues that the officials who administer citizenship law should 
adhere to the parentage determinations made by officials who generally 
administer family law. In the U.S., these are state-level family law judges 
applying state law. But domestic family law, in the U.S. and elsewhere, does 
not necessarily generate ideal or even tolerable outcomes on questions of 
citizenship. Titshaw holds up a particularly poorly drawn U.S. federal policy 
that regulates ius sanguinis citizenship as it applies to foreign-born children 
conceived using ART, but there are many examples of how the use of state 
family law to regulate citizenship transmission has generated equally objec-
tionable outcomes. 5
Alternatively, Bauböck would have us adopt a ‘ius filiationis’ standard 
that recognises the ‘social parent’ or the ‘primary caregiver’ as the parent for 
purposes of ius sanguinis citizenship. He urges that this would help remedy 
the ‘mismatch between biologically determined citizenship and parental 
care arrangements that would also open the door to abusive claims’. He is 
correct. My concern, however, is that his emphasis on ‘social parenting’ and 
‘primary caregiving’ is insufficient and has its own perils. First, it could 
5 For example, in 1940 the federal ius sanguinis citizenship statute was amended 
to include the nonmarital children of U.S. citizen fathers under certain circum-
stances, such as when the father had ‘legitimated’ the child. Federal officials 
turned to the law of the father’s domiciliary state to determine whether 
legitimation had, in fact, occurred. In the 1940s and 50s, marriage to the 
child’s mother was a very common mode of legitimation, but federal officials 
making citizenship determinations would not recognise an interracial marriage 
as the basis of a child’s citizenship claim if the father’s home state banned such 
marriages – and many did. See Collins, ‘Illegitimate Borders’, above n. 2, at 
2210.
K. Collins
107
increase the likelihood of abusive denials of citizenship by officials who, at 
least in the U.S., are often all too eager to find reasons to reject claims to citi-
zenship.6 In the case of nonmarital children – who make up a far greater 
portion of the global population than children conceived through ART – the 
restriction of parent-child citizenship transmission to ‘primary caregivers’ 
could lead to circumspect treatment, or outright rejection, of the father-child 
relationship as a basis for citizenship transmission. Indeed, the primary 
caregiver standard could stymie the caregiving efforts of unmarried fathers 
who are divided by nationality from their children, and hence may never be 
able to establish themselves as the ‘primary caregiver’. The emphasis on 
caregiving as a prerequisite could also aid unmarried fathers who prefer to 
avoid parental responsibility by distancing themselves geographically from 
their children. The result: a ius sanguinis citizenship regime that would but-
tress gender inequality by undermining men’s parental rights and helping 
them to avoid their parental responsibilities.7 Moreover, and regardless of 
one’s view of the equities as between parents, it is ultimately the nonmarital 
child’s citizenship and migration rights that could be destabilised, depend-
ing on how officials understood the concept of ‘social parent’. Dumbrava 
recognises the inequities associated with ‘the differential treatment of chil-
dren born within and out of wedlock with respect to access to citizenship’, 
but his solution – to abolish parent-child citizenship transmission alto-
gether – would give cold comfort to nonmarital children and marital chil-
dren alike.
This is not an endorsement for a purely genetic model of citizenship 
transmission. Despite the references to ‘blood’, ius sanguinis citizenship has 
never rested on purely biological conceptions of citizenship. Traditionally, 
marriage was fundamental to the ability of fathers to secure citizenship for 
their children, and – at least in the development of U.S. law – the presump-
tion that the mother is the sole caregiver of the nonmarital child led to the 
recognition of the mother-child relationship as a source of citizenship for 
foreign-born nonmarital children.8 Rather, I suggest that – unless and until 
we move beyond citizenship as the enforcement mechanism for basic human 
rights, and beyond the family as a foundational source of material and psy-
chological support for children, we cannot overstate the importance of 
6 See, for example, Saldana Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2013).
7 I develop this argument in: Collins, K.A. (2000), ‘When Fathers’ Rights Were 
Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright’, Yale 
Law Journal (109) 1669–1708 (1699–1705), and in ‘Illegitimate Borders’, 
above n. 2, at 2230–34.
8 See Collins, ‘Illegitimate Borders’, above n. 2, at 2199–2205.
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the generous recognition of the parent-child relationship for citizenship 
 transmission. The modernisation of ius sanguinis citizenship should thus 
include the recognition of ‘social parents’ and parents with ‘custodial 
rights’– as Bauböck rightly asserts – and also recognition of all who can be 
held legally responsible for a child’s care or support. Dumbrava may be 
unhappy that the whims of parents, people’s reproductive choices, and fac-
tors beyond the control of the individual would continue to determine mem-
bership in a political community. But it is precisely because citizenship 
designations rest on factors such as these that I wholly agree with his admo-
nition that we channel our efforts ‘towards consolidating democratic institu-
tion and promoting citizenship attitudes and skills among all those who find 
themselves, by whatever ways and for whatever reason, in our political 
community’.
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